Philippic
Édouard Philippe announced yesterday that he is running for president, although the election is still almost three years away. Or is it? As the seriousness of the current political impasse (see my previous post) becomes clearer by the day, it’s not unreasonable to think that the only way out will be a presidential resignation (although a few short-term governments may have to fall before Macron is forced to recognize that the real issue is his continuation in office, at least if he continues to make perpetuation of his policies the sine qua non of any prime ministerial appointment).
Philippe has a certain number of strengths. For one thing, his simmering hostility to Macron has long been apparent–although this no longer distinguishes him from his potential rivals (especially Attal and Wauquiez; Bertrand, Darmanin, and Le Maire have been more discreet in their critiques of Jupiter). Philippe’s philippics have not exactly been outspoken either, but his eye-rolling has been eloquent, and leaks about the frictions that heated his relations with the boss while serving as prime minister continue to flow. In any case, he has now reported for duty, although the brief flurry of attention he aroused with his announcement will immediately give way to renewed speculation about Macron’s choice for prime minister, or perhaps even a nomination, which could come at any moment.
All but insurmountable obstacles have now been placed in the path of the most recent candidates: Castets, Cazeneuve, Bertrand, Beaudet, and Bouarmane. The Bureau National of the PS voted 38 to 33 to continue to adhere to the NFP line and sanction any nominee who refuses to get with “le programme, tout le programme, et rien que le programme,” sauf bien sûr les compromis essentiels (non-précisés). The RN (in the person of Sébastien Chenu) has helpfully proposed two names to which it might not object: Jean-Louis Borloo and David Lisnard, This endorsement is probably the kiss of death for both. Macron may now try to pull yet another rabbit out of his hat, but the failure of the Beaudet initiative shows that obscurity is not necessarily an advantage. Prominence, of course, is not an advantage either. For instance, Olivier Blanchard does not lack for credibility if Macron should opt for a technocrat, but his outspoken critique of the NFP’s economic platform would likely sink such an initiative.
Meanwhile, the October 1 (soft?) deadline for submitting a budget looms. Macron is more and more isolated. Last year’s budget deficit turns out to have been larger than anticipated, so that any new government will be plunged into an immediate crisis. Summer is over, the Olympic truce has ended, and the political mess is worse than ever, yet the population at large seems strangely untouched by the furor that has gripped the political class. But this temporary respite will only increase the plausibility of the RN’s claim that “the elites” are out of touch with le pays réel as they pursue their jeux politiques that seem so remote and inconsequential to le citoyen lambda de Bourg-sur-Lethe.
1 Comment
Macron’s continuation of office is indeed a major problem, but it is not the largest issue in my view. The quasi-insurmountable problem is a Parliament that is split into three broadly equivalent groups: An equilateral triangle so-to-speak. Gustave Eiffel built his tower as an assembly of triangles for the simple reason that a triangle cannot change shape. A square can easily become a lozenge but when you have a triangle, you are stuck with it. An early resignation won’t help apart from the satisfaction of figuratively hanging a scalp on the wall. Parliament cannot be dissolved again before June 2025 and no one, even a new President, will take the risk again unless there is a quasi-certainty of getting something quite different from an equilateral triangle. Good luck with that, whoever.
Opinion polls are starting to show deep and widespread dissatisfaction with presidential procrastination.
I cannot resist offering my own handicapping of the coming presidential horse race on the right.
Philippe’s running is an excellent idea for him, but he has little chance. The moment a campaign opens people will remind him of the gilets jaunes crisis which some of his decisions provoked on the one hand and on the other hand of the horribly poor handling of the COVID crisis during the first months when he was still prime minister: the soundbites are surely being prepared as I write. No one has forgotten the lack of surgical masks which were initially hidden through official fantasy statements that they were not necessary nor the shortages of medicine.
Among other potential candidates that you mention, I don’t quite see anyone with a real chance except Darmanin:
– Le Maire will retire from politics after his great success over the past 7 years running French public finance into the ground, he should have stuck to litterature.
– Wauquiez heads a parliamentary party that now consistently scores in between the scores that the Trotskyites Alain Krivine and Arlette Laguiller used to make. He personally ran a European election campaign in 2019 that ran his party into the ground. He probably still has a (wet) dream…
– Attal is well liked but has two problems: his young age (the French have tried that one with Macron, thank you very much), and what could have helped him (Macron’s party) is now a deep sea anchor.
– Bertrand is mostly unknown by the French and doesn’t look like a very good campaigner. He is the Ballamou to Jacques C. Darmanin.
– Darmanin is likely the only one with a real chance, Sarkozy style in my view in a very conservative oriented campaign that would eat into the FN territory.
Still, the real issue is who would come first or second in a first round and too many of these potential candidates are looking for the same electorate. Having more than one running almost guarantees not going to a second round and this is surely the main reason why Philippe announced so early.
As for Le Pen which you did not mention, I believe that she has little chance as usual in the end: I took note of a serious opinion poll in between the two rounds of legislative elections where 67% of those polled said that they did not want an FN government. That was of course confirmed in the actual results.
Regarding the budget, it will be impossible for any government (after choosing a prime minister, you still need to find ministers and name a government and that will take quite a while…) to produce a decent budget that does not look like some idiot drafted it and get it voted in due time. France is thus most likely to run under the emergency dispositions of the Organic Law – LOLF article 45 mostly – (my personal preference in the LOLF for a good laugh goes to article 1G) in 2025 with a strict reproduction of the 2024 budget receipts and only essential expenditures until a new budget can be voted or, more likely, is not censored. This will be the legacy of the worst President France had since the inception of the 5th Republic as well as, probably, since the start of the 4th Republic (I don’t know enough about that one to be absolutely certain). Macron looked like a hope and turned out a catastrophe for the country. The exact opposite of Joe Biden I guess.